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Effects of Individual Resident Tax on the Consumption of Near-Retired 
Households in Japan 
 
 
We empirically investigate whether the Japanese individual resident tax causes a reduction 
in the consumption of near-retired households. In contrast to the income tax, the individual 
resident tax is levied on income from the previous year, and we found it has a negative 
effect on the consumption of three types of near-retired households: those who maintain 
regular employment, who move from regular to irregular employment, and who move from 
employment (regular, irregular, or self) to unemployment. Particularly, for the second type, 
the individual resident tax caused a larger reduction in household consumption.  
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1. Introduction 
 We use individual data to empirically analyze whether the individual resident tax 
causes a reduction in the consumption of near-retired households. As we show in section 3, 
the Japanese individual resident tax is levied on income from the previous year. As a result, 
for near-retired households, where income decreases with age, this tax may be a 
constraining factor for consumption.  
Figure 1 shows changes in the average value of worker income for the age cohorts 
50–54 and 55–59, using national data on wages and salaries for working households, from 
the “Family Income and Expenditure Survey” (Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communication, 2017). As Figure 1 shows, worker income tended to decrease 
after its peak in 2008, and also as the retirement age approaches.1 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Even for households with regular workers, when income declines on a yearly basis, the 
individual resident tax may represent a relatively large cost. A tax on income from the 
previous year is a particular problem for households with workers who have moved from 
regular to irregular employment, as is for retired households. These types of households 
normally have lower income compared to households with regular workers. After a change 
in employment or during the first year of retirement, due to the cost of the individual 
resident tax, household disposable income decreases and consumption may also decline.  
According to the life-cycle hypothesis, even if the individual resident tax is a tax 
on income from the previous year, for households able to anticipate this tax, the timing of 
the individual resident tax during retirement should not have an effect on consumption. 
However, if such an effect is observed, either the life-cycle hypothesis does not hold true, an 
                                                 
1 Typically, the mandatory retirement age was 60 before 2005. In 2006, the elderly labor promoting law “Act on 
Stabilization of Employment of Elderly Persons” was implemented, and companies had to raise the mandatory retirement 
age from 60 to 62 in 2006, to 63 between 2007 and 2009, to 64 between 2010 and 2012, and to 65 after 2013, with some 
exceptions.   
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overreaction is occurring in response to the cost the individual resident tax represents during 
retirement, or households not being able to properly anticipate the cost of the individual 
resident tax. In this study, we clarify these possibilities through empirical analysis. 
There are many opinions concerning the Japanese individual resident tax as a tax 
on income from the previous year. First, we introduce statements from organizations that 
believe that the individual resident tax should be a tax on income from the current year, as 
taxing income from the previous year has negative effects. For example, the Tax 
Commission of the Government of Japan (1968, p. 34) stated: “The resident tax is assessed 
based on income from the previous year. In other words, it is a tax on the previous year’s 
income. It is preferable that the tax be changed to apply to income from the current year, so 
that the tax is levied in response to the generation of income. This can be accomplished by 
bringing the point in time at which the tax is levied as close as possible to the point in time 
at which the income is generated. If such a transition is adopted, however, there will need to 
be changes to the way that withholding agents collect taxes, and a notification process for 
non-wage earned income will also need to be established. Therefore, further study is 
appropriate.” Additionally, the Tokyo-Chiho Certified Public Tax Accountants Association 
(2004, p. 46) stated: “… as it will be necessary for either withholding or year-end 
adjustment to occur, the administrative duties of those who pay wages will be increased. 
There is room for more study concerning the adoption of a tax on current year income. 
However, we advocate that a specific study be conducted with the aim of introducing a 
current year tax system at some point in the future.” Furthermore, the Tax Commission of 
the Government of Japan (2005, p. 13) affirmed that “the individual resident tax has been 
based on income from the previous year out of consideration for the administrative burden 
involved in paying taxes. However, essentially, for taxes on income, it is preferable that the 
point in time at which the income is generated and the point in time at which the tax is 
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levied be as close as possible. In recent years, the development of internet technologies, the 
diversification of employment structures, and changes in the economic climate have made 
the present moment an opportune time to conduct a study concerning the possibility of 
transitioning to a tax on current year income. Such a study should take the existing 
administrative burden of tax payers and others into account.” 
The above organizations support transitioning the individual resident tax to a tax on 
current year income. Conversely, other organizations feel that such a transition would be 
inherently negative. For example, the National Association of Towns and Villages (2014, p. 
9) stated that “concerning transitioning the individual resident tax to a tax on current year 
income, as such a transition would increase the administrative burden of municipalities and 
business owners, should be carefully studied.” Also, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (2015, p. 30) asserted that “the transition of the individual resident tax to a tax on 
current year income is being studied. However, for business owners, such a transition would 
require that businesses administer not only the income tax, but also the withholding or 
year-end adjustments associated with the individual resident tax. We oppose such a 
transition, as it would increase administrative burdens above current levels.” According to 
these organizations, the important questions are whether it is necessary to synchronize to as 
great a degree as possible the point in time income is produced to the point in time it is 
taxed, and whether a transition to a tax on current year income will increase the 
administrative burden of companies and local governments.2 
Here, we move forward from these two problems, and present a novel issue that is 
more economic in nature. That is, we analyze whether the individual resident tax, as a tax 
on income from the previous year, causes a reduction in the consumption of near-retired 
                                                 
2 An example of an issue regarding transitioning to a tax on present year income is the synchronization of local tax 
benefits and liabilities. To coordinate the timing of local public services with the tax burden of the individual resident tax, 
the latter should transition to a tax on current year income.  
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households. We use panel data, covering retiring employees for this analysis.3 If the 
individual resident tax is causing a reduction in the consumption levels of near-retired 
households, then, it is also causing a reduction in household utility. If this is the case, a 
transition of the individual resident tax to a tax on income for the current year should be 
supported as a countermeasure. Alternatively, if the current system is to continue, policies to 
prevent the reduction of household consumption levels before and after retirement need to 
be studied. 
In this paper, we use data from a large-scale government panel survey, carried out 
since 2005, which includes the behavior of individuals aged 50 to 59 in 2005. The 
information necessary to calculate the individual resident tax, including family structure, 
income, and employment status can be ascertained from this study. Total figures on 
household consumption are also included. 
While controlling unobserved heterogeneity between individuals using a fixed 
effect model, we have estimated the effect of the individual resident tax on consumption. 
The results show that, for households that maintained regular employment, for workers who 
moved from regular to irregular employment, and for workers who experienced a mix of 
regular, irregular, and self-employment, the individual resident tax had a negative effect on 
consumption. For households with workers who moved from regular to irregular 
employment, the individual resident tax caused a significantly larger reduction in household 
consumption. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews previous research 
relevant to the contents of this paper. Section 3 contains an outline of the individual resident 
tax. Section 4 describes a household behavior model based on the life-cycle hypothesis, 
                                                 
3 We use data on individuals aged between 52 and 64. For the analyzed individuals, some workers continue to be 
employed, some face changes in employment type (e.g., full- to part-time), and some are retired. 
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which provides the foundation for the empirical analysis contained in this paper. Section 5 
presents an estimation model, and Section 6 explains the data and presents the results of our 
estimates. Section 7, the final section, compiles the results of our analysis and presents 
policy implications. 
 
2. Literature Survey 
 If the life-cycle hypothesis holds, households should smooth consumption, as they 
can anticipate changes such as retirement and taxation. As this is an area of significant 
interest for empirical analysis, particularly regarding changes in consumption during 
retirement, a large body of previous research exists (e.g., Banks et al., 1998; Bernheim et al., 
2001; Stephens Jr., 2003; Smith, 2004; Schwerdt, 2005; Hurst, 2008; Wakabayashi, 2008; 
Battistin et.al., 2009; Kureishi, 2011; Aguila et al., 2011; Stephens and Unayama, 2012; 
Hori and Murata, 2014; Kureishi and Yin, 2015; Li et al., 2015).4 
 This previous research primarily considers income shocks experienced during 
retirement, such as unanticipated early retirement, health deterioration, changes in 
dependents, or death of a spouse. It then subdivides consumer expenditure into different 
types, focusing on how low income individuals deal with financial constraints, and creates 
various mechanisms for actions such as identifying income brackets. Here, we focus on 
previous studies that examine whether household consumption responds to changes in 
income caused by the tax or social security systems, issues similar to the ones addressed in 
this paper. The following studies examine empirically whether different scenarios create a 
significant response in household consumption. For instance, Parker (1999) deals with the 
rate of income increase when the upper limits of social security tax are exceeded; Souleles 
(1999) looks at tax refunds, many received in the second quarter; Johnson et al. (2006) and 
                                                 
4 Hurst (2008) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) perform extensive surveys in this respect. 
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Agarwal et al. (2007) deal with the 2001 tax rebates; and, along the same lines, Parker et al. 
(2013) deal with the 2008 rebates. For research conducted in Japan, Hori and Shimizutani 
(2002) analyze the effects of the 1998 reduction in income and individual resident taxes, 
and Hori et al. (2002) analyze the effect of regional shopping coupons. Most of this research 
indicates that changes in income caused by the tax and social security systems, such as tax 
rebates or tax reductions, result in a consumption increase. The analytical methods of these 
previous studies assume the life-cycle hypothesis, and use estimation methods based on the 
Euler equation for consumption. These studies also use individual data. Accordingly, the 
empirical analysis contained in this paper also uses estimation models based on the Euler 
equation and individual panel data that reflects the behavior of near-retired households. To 
verify the estimation model, we thus outline the individual resident tax system, which taxes 
income from the previous year, in the next section. 
 
3. Outline of the Individual Resident Tax 
 Here, we explain the structure by which the individual resident tax is applied to 
income from the previous year. In Japan, the timing of the income tax (a national tax), 
levied on income from the current year, is different from the timing of the individual 
resident tax (a local tax). 
 Person H, a salaried employee, earns income from working at Company F for a 
period of one year, from January 1 to December 31 of Year 1. Person H is paid wages by 
Company F for Year 1 between January and December, which withholds income tax from 
Person H’s wages. When the year-end adjustment occurs in December, Person H pays 
income tax owed to the tax office in proportion to the amount of tax that has been withheld. 
Accordingly, the process of collecting the income tax, a tax on income from the current year, 
is concluded within the current year by means of the year-end adjustment. 
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 When Year 2 begins, Company F notifies Municipality M, the municipality in 
which Person H lives on January 1, Year 2, of Person H’s wages for Year 1. Municipality M 
calculates Person H’s individual resident tax liability, and asks Company F to withhold 
income from Person H’s wages until around May of Year 2. Company F, having received 
the withholding request, withholds the monthly amount of individual resident tax from June 
of Year 2 to May of Year 3 by deducting it from Person H’s wages, and pays the tax to 
Municipality M. The individual resident tax paid to Municipality M includes municipal and 
prefectural resident taxes. In this way, prefectural resident taxes are paid to the prefecture 
through the municipality. The process of collecting the individual resident tax extends in 
Year 2. The problem addressed in this paper is whether the individual resident tax affects 
the consumption levels of near-retired households.5  
 For salaried employees, the amount of the individual resident tax is calculated in 
the following manner. Salaried income deductions are calculated using salaried income 
from the previous year and, by subtracting these deductions from salaried income, 
employment income is obtained. Employment income deductions are calculated using 
household family structure and social security payments. These employment income 
deductions are then subtracted from employment income, thus yielding the taxable income. 
A tax rate of 10% is applied to taxable income (4% prefectural and 6% municipal tax). 
Therefore, the amount of individual income tax is obtained. 
 For example, using the 2016 tax structure, let us compare the income and 
individual resident taxes for a single, salaried employee earning JPY 4 million. If only the 
salaried income deduction, basic deduction, and JPY 400,000 social security payment 
                                                 
5 Active salaried workers can choose a special collection of the individual resident tax. The special collection is a 
withholding method in which tax is withheld from a worker’s salary by their employer. However, after retirement, 
households switch from special to general collection. In general collection, an individual must directly pay individual taxes 
to the municipality in which he/she lives. Even households whose income has decreased due to retirement must pay their 
individual resident tax.  
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deduction are applied, the amount of income tax will be JPY 95,900, and the individual 
resident tax JPY 195,500.6 That is, the individual resident tax will be greater than the 
income tax, a fact that has a significant effect on consumption by itself.7 
 Generally, a reduction in income with age is observed for salaried employees close 
to retirement. As a result, the individual resident tax, which is calculated using the higher 
earnings from the previous year, may affect consumption in the current period. Furthermore, 
when a worker moves from regular employment to irregular employment, the change in 
employment status is usually accompanied by a large income reduction.8 As such, we 
empirically study what types of effects the individual resident tax has on the consumption of 
retirement-age households with reduced income.9 
 
4. Household Behavior According to the Life-cycle Hypothesis 
 Here, we propose the model that forms the basis of our analysis. Let t represent 
time. We assume that a household has a time-sealable utility, u, which is a function of 
uncertain consumption, Ct. Then, we can express the households’ expected utility, V, as 
follows: 
𝑉 = ∑
𝐸0[𝑢(𝐶𝑡)]
(1 + 𝜌)𝑡
,
𝑡=0
     (1) 
where ρ is the time preference. Additionally, we assume that 𝑢’(𝐶𝑡) > 0、𝑢
′′(𝐶𝑡) < 0. Next, 
household budget constraints are assumed to be as follows: 
𝐴𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟)(𝐴𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡),    (2) 
                                                 
6 From this figure for individual resident tax, JPY 77,700 represents the prefectural and JPY 117,800 the municipal tax. 
7 The circumstance by which the individual resident tax became higher than the income tax is the tax source transition 
implemented in 2007. The scale of this transition was around JPY 3 trillion. 
8 Households whose income has decreased and have switched to general collection immediately following retirement can 
expect a large tax burden. 
9 A lump-sum retirement bonus is paid when a worker retires. However, the individual resident tax that should be paid in 
the next fiscal year is normally withheld from this sum, and thus paid in the current year. Retirement money is therefore 
not subject to the next year’s individual resident tax, and the effect of this tax on the bonus is limited. 
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where savings are At, income is Yt, the amount of tax owed is Tt, and the interest rate is r. 
Solving the expected utility maximization problem using equations (1) and (2), we obtain 
the Euler equation below: 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐶𝑡
=
(1 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝜌)
𝐸 (
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐶𝑡+1
) .    (3) 
Additionally, we specify utility at a point in time, u(Ct), in constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) form: 
u(𝐶𝑡) =
𝐶𝑡
1−𝛾
1 − 𝛾
,    (4) 
where the relative risk aversion is γ, elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/γ, and 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐶𝑡
=
𝐶𝑡
−𝛾. Subsequently, we assume that consumption C follows a log normal distribution (lnC
～N(μ,σ2)). Then, if we assume that the interest rate, r, and the time preference, ρ, are 
sufficiently small, the Euler equation can be expressed as follows: 
𝐶𝑡
−𝛾 =
(1 + 𝑟)
(1 + 𝜌)
𝐸[𝐶𝑡+1
−𝛾 ] = 𝑒(𝑟−𝜌)𝐸[𝑒−𝛾𝐶𝑡+1]＝𝑒(𝑟−𝜌)𝑒−𝛾𝜇+
1
2𝛾
2𝜎2 .    (5) 
If we take the log and organize the above expressions, we obtain the following equation: 
𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑡＝
𝑟 − 𝜌
𝛾
+
1
2
𝛾𝑉𝐴𝑅 [ln 𝐶𝑡+1] + 𝜀𝑡+1,    (6) 
where 𝜀𝑡+1 ≡ 𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑡+1 − 𝐸[𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑡+1]. Using equation (6) and based on the relationship 
between the magnitude of the interest rate, r, and the time preference ratio, ρ, changes in 
household consumption, ln𝐶𝑡+1 − ln𝐶𝑡 , can be determined. If the life-cycle hypothesis 
holds, factors contributing to changes in income, such as the individual resident tax, should 
not affect consumption Ct. However, if households cannot anticipate changes in income due 
to the individual resident tax, there will be an effect on consumption Ct. Even if changes in 
income are anticipated, there may be an overreaction in household consumption. If for some 
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reason consumption smoothing cannot be performed, there will also be an effect on 
household utility levels. Accordingly, we address whether and to what degree changes in 
individual resident tax affect household consumption Ct. Additionally, we analyze the effect 
of the income tax on consumption and compare it to the effects of the individual resident tax. 
In the next section, we construct an estimation method based on equation (6) and perform 
the empirical analysis. 
 
5. Estimation Model and Data 
 We estimate the following regression model from equation (6) in the previous 
section: 
△ ln 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙△ 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + ∑{𝛽2𝑗 ∙ 𝜤(𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗) + 𝛽3𝑗 ∙△ 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝜤(𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗)}
4
𝑗=2
 
+𝛽4 ∙ 𝒙 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,    (7) 
 
where the household is denoted by i, the year is t, the difference in the individual resident 
tax is △ 𝐿𝑇, changes in employment status are Cemp (j = 1, ⋯ , 4), the control variable is 
𝒙, the regression coefficient is β, the fixed effect is δ, and the error term is ε. 𝜤(∙) is the 
indicator function, and △ 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝜤(𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗) the interaction term. The response variable 
is the change in consumption, △ ln 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ≡ ln 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − ln 𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1. We also use four categories of 
employment status. These are regular (full-time), irregular (part-time, temporary, by 
commission), self-employed, or unemployed. The variable that expresses changes in 
employment status is defined as follows. For years in which employment status does not 
change from regular, Cemp = 1; if employment status changes from regular to irregular, 
Cemp = 2 ; if employment status changes from employed (regular, irregular, or 
self-employed) to unemployed, Cemp = 3; and for all other changes to employee status, 
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Cemp = 4. The base case for the following estimation results is Cemp = 1. 
 It is possible to differentiate between unemployment due to involuntary and 
voluntary job loss (retirement). However, in analyzing the effects of the individual resident 
tax, as both scenarios imply that individuals are not working and as discerning between 
these scenarios would make the sample size unusably small for some years, we have 
conducted the analysis without making this distinction. The reason for not taking the 
logarithm of the difference in individual resident tax, △ 𝐿𝑇, is that, if a household’s income 
is below a fixed amount, their individual resident tax will be zero. 
 Based on the estimation results from equation (7), we examine whether the 
individual resident tax affects consumption. If the life-cycle hypothesis does hold, the 
individual resident tax should not affect consumption, and we verify null hypothesis 1: 
 
E [
𝜕∆𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕∆𝐿𝑇
| 𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝑘] = 0,   𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, 4.         (8) 
 
Equation (8) verifies whether the average marginal effect (AME), which represents the 
changes in consumption with respect to the changes in the individual resident tax, is zero. 
We evaluate AME using each possible change in employment status (𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝). If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, changes to the individual resident tax affect consumption, which 
contradicts the life-cycle hypothesis. Particularly, if AME is negative, the individual 
resident tax causes a decrease in consumption. 
 Subsequently, if the life-cycle hypothesis does not hold (if the null hypothesis 
above is rejected), we verify whether the effect the individual resident tax has on 
consumption varies with employment status. For example, if AME for individuals who 
moved from regular to irregular employment is smaller than for individuals who maintained 
regular employment (i.e., the negative value is larger), we can conclude that the variations 
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in the individual resident tax were larger for those whose employment status changed (i.e., 
who moved from regular to irregular employment). Therefore, we verify null hypothesis 2: 
 
E [
𝜕∆𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕∆𝐿𝑇
| 𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝑘 ] − E [
𝜕∆𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕∆𝐿𝑇
| 𝐶𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 1] = 0,     𝑘 = 2, 3, 4.         (9) 
 
Equation (9) determines whether the difference between the AME of individuals whose 
employment status did not change from regular employment and of individuals whose 
employment status did change is zero. If this null hypothesis is rejected, variations in the 
individual resident tax affect consumption differently depending on changes to employment 
status. Here, we are particularly interested in the difference between situations in which 
workers moved from regular to irregular employment (Cemp = 2) and those in which 
workers maintained regular employment (Cemp = 1), and also in the difference between 
situations in which workers went from being employed to unemployed (Cemp = 3) and 
those in which workers maintained regular employment. If these differences are negative, 
variations in the individual resident tax caused a greater decrease in the consumption of 
workers whose employment status changed than in the consumption of workers who 
maintained regular employment. The reason for the existence of the interaction term in 
equation (7) is to estimate equations (8) and (9). We have also conducted analysis on the 
income tax, in which we replace △ 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 from equations (7), (8), and (9) with the difference 
in income tax, △ 𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡. 
 Further, we use a fixed effect model to estimate equation (7). Concerning the 
relationship between variations in the individual resident tax and changes in consumption, 
the estimations may be mutually dependent. In other words, there is a possibility of 
endogeneity (simultaneous determinacy). For example, workers with a specific skill may 
earn comparatively higher wages and thus pay a higher individual resident tax. If the 
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income and individual resident tax for such a worker decrease due to changes in 
employment, consumption may drop dramatically. On the other hand, workers with no 
specific skills may not have paid high individual resident taxes to begin with. For them, the 
effects of the individual resident tax at retirement will likely be limited. However, bias may 
exist in estimates of the relationship between variations in individual resident tax and 
changes in consumption that do not consider these types of scenarios. For estimation 
methods that consider this type of endogeneity, in instances where cross-sectional data are 
used, instrumental variables may be employed. Furthermore, the use of panel data allows 
the use of a fixed effects model, in which heterogeneity between individuals that is time 
invariant is captured by a fixed effect, 𝛿𝑖.10 The fixed effect δ can be correlated with 
∆𝐿𝑇. 
The panel data used in the paper is individual data from the “Longitudinal Survey 
of Middle-aged and Elderly Persons,” conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare. This survey was first conducted at the end of October in 2005 for individuals aged 
50 to 59. The data used for the analysis in this paper is from 2007 to 2010. Data until 2006 
was not used because the sources of tax revenue shifted in 2007 to depend less on the 
income tax, a national tax, and more on the individual resident tax (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communication, 2009). If we use both the data before and after the shifting of 
tax revenue sources in 2007, it would not be possible to determine whether effects on 
income were due to an increase in the individual resident tax caused by the shifting tax 
revenue or due to the fact the individual resident tax is a tax on the previous year’s income. 
Therefore, we have only used data from after the tax revenue shift. Due to the shifting of tax 
                                                 
10 However, even if this type of endogeneity is considered as a fixed effect, heterogeneity between individuals that varies 
with time may persist. In such cases, a fixed-effects regression with instrumental variables can be used. This method deals 
with heterogeneity between individuals that does not change over time using a fixed effect and with heterogeneity between 
individuals that does change over time using instrumental variables. However, in this paper, we only perform estimates 
based on a fixed effects model. Usually, it is difficult to find appropriate instrumental variables. However, this is an issue 
for future study. 
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revenue sources, the income tax was reduced, while the individual resident tax increased. 
Accordingly, the effect of the individual resident tax on individuals of near-retirement age 
should be larger following the shift.11 
Of the 25,157 men and women who responded to the survey from 2005 to 2010, 
we screened 5,298 regularly employed, married men in 2007. Any individual whose income 
in 2007 was zero or missing was excluded, as were those whose employment status has 
been missing at any point since 2008. Additionally, regarding variables with positive values, 
values that exceeded three standard deviations have also been excluded as outliers. The 
standard deviation is computed excluding zero values. We have limited our analysis to men 
because, in the generation being studied, many households live primarily on income they 
earn. As a result, when focusing on men, the effects of the individual resident tax and of 
changes in employment status should be more pronounced. We also restricted our analysis 
to married individuals because the income and consumption trends of married and 
unmarried individuals differ significantly, to the effect that each group would need to be 
analyzed individually. However, the sample of unmarried individuals was not large enough 
for analysis. 
The variables used in this paper were produced in the following manner. The 
presence of double quotations indicates data entries from the survey. Household 
consumption, C, is “Household expenditures” (monthly). Household individual resident tax, 
𝐿𝑇, was calculated using the following procedure. First, if an individual “Has income,” 
then the “Amount of income in the last month apart from public pension income” was 
multiplied by 12. As this figure does not include bonuses, the income from wages including 
                                                 
11 For example, according to the National Tax Agency (2006), a family consisting of a husband, wife, and two children 
with earnings of JPY 5 million would have paid JPY 119,000 in income tax and 76,000 in individual resident tax before 
the tax revenue source shift. After the shift, an income tax of JPY 59,500 (50% less than before the reforms) and individual 
resident tax of JPY 135,500 (78% more) would have been paid. However, the total amount of taxes paid before and after 
the reform remained similar. 
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bonuses was obtained by multiplying the base wage by a bonus factor. This bonus factor 
was computed as a ratio of “Annual special cash earnings” on “Contractual cash earnings” 
from the “Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2010)”. 
These figures differ based on employment status, age group, industry, and gender. 
Applying the individual resident tax schedule to income from the previous year, we 
calculated the amount of individual resident tax, 𝐿𝑇, as follows. Taking the household’s 
situation into account, we calculated taxable income by applying the following deductions: 
earned income deduction (at least JPY 650,000), basic deduction (JPY 330,000), spouse 
deduction (JPY 330,000), deductions for dependents (JPY 330,000), and the social security 
fee deduction, calculated using the simple calculation equation from the Ministry of Finance 
(Ministry of Finance Policy Research Institute, 2016). By applying a 10% tax rate to this 
figure, we obtained the amount of individual resident tax. Additionally, for subjects 
recorded under “Has income,” because they receive a pension, we multiplied the “Amount 
of public pension received” (bi-monthly) by 6. We calculated the individual resident tax 
from the pension income of previous year as well, considering the public pension deduction.  
For 𝑁𝑇, the amount of income tax, we calculated this figure by applying the 
income tax schedule to income earned in the current year. 
Regarding controlled variables, we used dummy variables to represent the 
following conditions: a spouse with earned income, a dependent child (under 24 living with 
parents), age above 60, housing (owning a house, renting, other). We also used objective 
changes to health condition (positive values mean subjective improvement of health), and 
year dummies.  
 
6. Estimation Results 
 Appendix A shows the characteristics of the sample used in this paper. Panel A 
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shows changes in age. The sample was between ages 52–61 in 2007 and 55–64 in 2010. 
Panel B shows changes in sample size by employment status. In 2007, all analyzed subjects 
were regular employees, a portion of the sample moving to irregular employment, 
self-employment, or unemployment over time. As such, the number of regular employees 
decreased, and the number of those irregularly employed and unemployed increased. Panel 
C shows variations in the sample size through changes in employment status (Cemp = 1 −
4). Cemp = 1, which denotes maintaining regular employment, is the most common. Our 
interest is the change of consumption for Cemp = 2, which denotes a change from regular 
to irregular employment, with a total number of 1,400 observations, and that of Cemp = 3, 
which denotes a change from employment to unemployment, with a total number of 769 
observations. Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the data used in our analysis, 
including the mean values and standard deviations for the pooled data for 2008–2010. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Table 2 shows changes in mean, standard deviation, and sample size for 
consumption, individual resident tax, and income tax by employment status, respectively. 
Ranked by total consumption, regular employees are the highest with JPY 4.04 million per 
year, followed by irregular employees with 3.34 million and the unemployed with 3.23 
million. Therefore, consumption differs due to changes in employment status. According to 
total individual annual resident tax, regular employees pay the most at JPY 317,000 (on 
average), and the self-employed pay a similar amount. On the other hand, irregular 
employees pay around JPY 169,000. The unemployed, who earn no wages, are still obliged 
to pay an average individual resident tax of around JPY 150,000, which is levied on the 
previous year’s income. Regarding total annual income tax, the regularly employed pay the 
highest income tax at around JPY 410,000. As the income tax is on current year income, the 
unemployed pay only JPY 40,000, considerably less than either irregular employees or the 
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self-employed. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Panel A of Appendix B shows a scatter plot and histogram of the main analyzed 
variables: changes in individual resident tax (∆LT) and in consumption (∆lnC). This figure 
contains all analyzed data. The horizontal axis is ∆LT and the vertical axis is ∆lnC, the 
histogram showing a roughly symmetrical distribution for both variables. The straight line 
on the scatter plot represents the fitted values according to ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, which exhibit an inverse relationship (that is, as ∆LT  increases, ∆lnC 
decreases). Panel B shows scatter plots according to changes in employment status (Cemp). 
The fitted values for Cemp = 1,2,3  according to the OLS regression, which are 
represented by straight red lines, trend downward as they move to the right. Panel A of 
Appendix C shows a scatter plot and histogram representing the changes in income tax 
(∆NT) and consumption (∆lnC). The fitted values, according to the OLS regression, within 
the scatter plot exhibit a positive relationship (that is, as ∆NT increases, ∆lnC increases). 
Accordingly, the individual resident and income taxes may have different effects on 
consumption changes. 
 Table 3 shows the estimated results of the fixed effect model. As correlation in the 
behavior within survey responders was predicted, we estimated clustered standard errors at 
the respondent level.12 Column (1) shows the estimated results for changes in individual 
resident tax (∆LT), whose coefficient is negative and statistically significant, as is for 
Cemp = 2 and Cemp = 3, the variable that represents changes in employment status. 
Regarding the interaction term, ∆LT × (Cemp = 2)  is both negative and statistically 
significant. 
                                                 
12 Typically, a clustered standard error is larger than a robust standard error that considers heteroscedasticity, making it 
harder for variables to achieve significance. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Panel A of Figure 2 shows the estimated results graphically, based on Column (1) 
of Table 3. The vertical axis represents the predicted values of ∆lnC, and the horizontal axis 
represents ∆LT evaluated at ∆LT = −15, −10, ⋯ ,10 (i.e., the unit is JPY 10,000). The 
slope of each line corresponds to the AME in equation (8). If the life-cycle hypothesis holds, 
∆lnC should not respond to ∆LT, and the slope should be flat (i.e., the marginal effect 
should be zero). Additionally, as equation (7) contains no second-order terms related to 
∆LT, the AME (slope) is the same regardless of which ∆LT value it is evaluated at. In 
Panel A of Figure 2, the slope of Cemp = 1 is gently negative. The slopes of Cemp = 2 
and Cemp = 3  are also negative. The differences between the slopes of each line 
correspond to the differences between the AMEs in equation (9). In contrast to the gentle 
slope of Cemp = 1, the slope of Cemp = 2 is steeper. In other words, the individual 
resident tax is expected to have a larger effect for workers moving from regular to irregular 
employment than for those who maintain regular employment. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 Table 4 shows the test results of the null hypotheses, which deal with marginal 
effects. Panel A shows marginal effects related to ∆LT. The top section of the table shows 
the test results for null hypothesis 1. Here, the marginal effect is equivalent to the slopes of 
the lines from Figure 2. The marginal effects for Cemp = 1,2,3  are negative and 
statistically significant, thus rejecting null hypothesis 1. A tendency towards the decrease of 
consumption due to the individual resident tax is shown, but the results are not consistent 
with the life-cycle hypothesis. 
 The lower part of Panel A in Table 4 shows the test results for null hypothesis 2, a 
hypothesis dealing with differences in the marginal effect. The differences are equivalent to 
the differences in the slopes of the lines in Figure 2. For (Cemp = 2) − (Cemp = 1), the 
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null hypothesis is rejected, implying that the individual resident tax had a greater effect on 
consumption for those workers whose employment status changed from regular to irregular 
employment than for those who maintained regular employment. On the other hand, 
(Cemp = 3) − (Cemp = 1) is not significant. The individual resident tax did not reduce 
consumption more for workers who retired than for workers who maintained regular 
employment. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Column (2) of Table 3 shows the estimated results for changes in income tax (∆NT), 
whose coefficient is positive and statistically significant. None of the Cemp coefficients are 
significant. The interaction term ∆NT × (Cemp = 3) is positive and statistically 
significant. Panel B of Figure 2 shows the estimated results graphically, based on Column 
(2) of Table 3. The slopes of Cemp = 1,2,3 are all positive. 
 Panel B of Table 4 shows the results of testing the null hypothesis for the 
significance of the marginal effect. The top part of the table shows the test results of null 
hypothesis 1. The marginal effect of Cemp = 1,2,3 is positive and statistically significant, 
and the null hypothesis is rejected. This result is not consistent with the life-style hypothesis. 
The income tax being levied on present year income, it has a high correlation with income. 
These results imply that when income decreases, it causes a decrease in consumption. The 
lower part of Panel B in Table 4 shows the test results of null hypothesis 2, which is related 
to differences in marginal effect. Differences in the marginal effect correspond to the 
differences of slopes of the lines in Figure 2. For (Cemp = 3) − (Cemp = 1) , null 
hypothesis 2 is rejected. As such, the income tax had a larger effect on consumption for 
workers who moved from employment to unemployment than for those who maintained 
regular employment. 
The results of the analysis above show that the individual resident tax has a 
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negative effect on consumption for individuals who maintain regular employment, for those 
whose employment status changes from regular to irregular employment, and for those who 
go from being employed to being unemployed. Particularly, for households with workers 
whose employment status changes from regular to irregular employment, a larger negative 
effect on consumption is shown. As such, households may be unable to predict the amount 
of individual resident tax at retirement. Alternatively, they may be able to predict it, and yet 
still feel the need to reduce their consumption levels by a relatively large degree. Our results 
indicate that the individual resident tax prevents near-retired households from smoothing 
consumption and has a negative effect on household utility. On the other hand, the income 
tax has a positive effect on consumption. This is likely because a decrease in income results 
in a lower income tax. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 We conducted an empirical analysis using individual data on whether the Japanese 
individual resident tax, a tax on income from the previous year, causes a decrease in 
consumption for near-retired households. If households perform consumption as predicted 
by the life-cycle hypothesis and are able to anticipate individual resident tax as a tax on 
income from the previous year, the amount of individual resident tax they need to pay after 
retirement should not have an effect on household consumption. Our analysis uses 
individual data from the “Longitudinal Survey of Middle-aged and Elderly Persons,” 
conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. According to our results, which 
estimated changes in consumption for households with workers whose employment status 
remains regular, workers whose employment status changes from regular to irregular 
employment, or workers who move from employment to retirement, the individual resident 
tax causes a reduction in the consumption. Particularly, for workers whose employment 
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status changes from regular to irregular employment, household consumption reduces even 
more. On the other hand, no such tendency was observed for the income tax. This means 
that households were unable to anticipate the individual resident tax at retirement, or even 
for households able to anticipate it, they had to decrease consumption levels. The fact that 
the individual resident tax had a negative effect on variations in household consumption 
means that it inhibited the smoothing of household consumption and had a negative effect 
on household utility. 
 From the results above, we can conclude that the individual resident tax system, in 
which income from the previous year is taxed, is not a desirable system, because of its 
negative effect on consumption levels. The Tax Commission of the Government of Japan 
(1968, 2005) and Tokyo-Chiho Certified Public Tax Accountants Association (2014) have 
expressed the view that the individual resident tax should transition to a tax on present year 
income. The fact that the current system has a negative effect on household consumption 
supports the study of such a transition. Alternatively, if the individual resident tax is to be 
maintained as a tax on income from the previous year, some sort of countermeasure is 
necessary to prevent household consumption from declining. For example, for employees 
yet to retire, awareness of the fact that the individual resident tax is a tax on income from 
the previous year could be increased. Additionally, a pre-payment system could be 
established for the payment of this tax by those of retirement age. Finally, the individual 
resident tax incurred in the year immediately after retirement could be paid before 
retirement.  
 The analysis in this paper has certain limitations. First, we only considered the total 
amount of consumption and, as a result, employment-related spending has been included. 
As such, it is possible that consumption decreased because employment status changed. 
Additionally, as the data used for annual consumption in our analysis are computed from the 
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monthly consumption on October of each year recorded in the survey, additional 
consumption in months when bonuses are paid or during the holiday season is not included. 
This is due to the limitations of the survey data used in this paper. In the future, we would 
like to analyze different types of consumption subdivisions. Furthermore, the figures for 
income and individual resident tax used in this paper have been estimated by applying the 
tax system based on information such as income, employment status, and family structure 
from the survey. As such, it is possible that these figures differ from the actual amount of 
individual resident and income tax paid. If it had been possible to use actual data on these 
taxes, a more precise analysis could have been performed. This is an issue for future study. 
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Figure 1: Annual Labor Income 
 
 
Note: This graph shows the average national wage salaries for worker’s households by age cohort for the 
head of household, as per the “Yearly Average of Monthly Receipts and Disbursements Per Household” 
from the “Family Income and Expenditure Survey,” conducted by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communication. The units are expressed in JPY 10,000 per year. 
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Figure 2: Estimation Results for Individual Resident and Income Taxes 
Panel A: Relationship Between the Estimated Results for ΔLT and Δln Consumption 
(Delta ln C) 
 
Panel B: Estimation Results for the Relationship Between ΔNT and Δln Consumption 
(Delta ln C) 
 
Note: This figure shows the relationship between the change of each tax and the Δln of consumption 
based on the estimated results in Table 3.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Note: The Cemp variable expresses changes in employment status: Cemp = 1 represents maintaining 
regular employment, Cemp = 2 represents moving from regular to irregular employment, Cemp = 3 
represents moving from employment (regular, irregular, or self) to unemployment, and Cemp = 4 
represents all other changes. (d) represents a dummy variable.
Variable Unit N Avg. S.D. Min Max
Annual consumption (C) 10,000 JPY 20,227 392.17 (180.08) 0 1,716.0
ΔLn C 14,359 -0.029 (0.310) -1.11 1.0
Annual labor income 10,000 JPY 17,925 584.32 (434.47) 0 4,613.7
Annual pension 10,000 JPY 20,862 14.60 (44.04) 0 300.0
Annual local tax (LT) 10,000 JPY 18,237 29.18 (32.64) 0 398.9
Annual national tax (NT) 10,000 JPY 18,161 35.65 (86.86) 0 1,312.0
ΔLT 10,000 JPY 11,853 -0.866 (12.96) -67.51 65.50
ΔNT 10,000 JPY 10,905 -4.140 (25.07) -210.83 202.33
Employment = Regular (d) 21,192 0.822 (0.382) 0 1
Employment = Irregular (d) 21,192 0.100 (0.300) 0 1
Employment = Self-emp. (d) 21,192 0.021 (0.144) 0 1
Employment = Unemployed (d) 21,192 0.057 (0.231) 0 1
Cemp = 1 (d) 15,894 0.742 (0.437) 0 1
Cemp = 2 (d) 15,894 0.088 (0.283) 0 1
Cemp = 3 (d) 15,894 0.050 (0.218) 0 1
Cemp = 4 (d) 15,894 0.120 (0.325) 0 1
Existence of spouse income (d) 19,337 0.561 (0.496) 0 1
Existence of dependent children (d) 21,192 0.190 (0.392) 0 1
Health condition (HC) = 1 (Very bad) (d) 21,038 0.005 (0.070) 0 1
HC = 2 (Bad) (d) 21,038 0.024 (0.152) 0 1
HC = 3 (Rather bad) (d) 21,038 0.129 (0.335) 0 1
HC = 4 (Rather good) (d) 21,038 0.439 (0.496) 0 1
HC = 5 (Good) (d) 21,038 0.344 (0.475) 0 1
HC = 6 (Very good) (d) 21,038 0.059 (0.236) 0 1
ΔHC 15,671 -0.013 (0.812) -5 5
House: Own (d) 21,191 0.906 (0.292) 0 1
House: Rent (d) 21,191 0.066 (0.249) 0 1
House : Other (d) 21,191 0.028 (0.164) 0 1
Age 60 or more (d) 21,192 0.298 (0.457) 0 1
Age Year Old 21,192 57.735 (2.831) 52 64
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Table 2: Average Consumption, Local and National taxes 
 
 
 
Note: The left-hand column shows the average, standard deviation, and sample size for consumption. The middle one shows the same measures for the 
individual resident tax (LT), and the right-hand one for the income tax (NT). 
Consumption (JPY 10,000 / Year) LT (JPY 10,000 / Year) NT (JPY 10,000 / Year)
Employment 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total Employment 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total Employment 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Regular Avg. 409.8 403.4 399.6 402.5 404.3 Regular 28.7 33.3 33.5 32.3 31.7 Regular 39.7 42.5 43.1 39.6 41.0
Std. (182.4) (180.7) (183.) (189.3) (183.6) (28.4) (32.8) (37.4) (38.6) (33.6) (82.1) (93.8) (100.2) (95.6) (91.6)
N 5,083 4,326 3,828 3,388 16,625 4,873 4,564 2,846 2,704 14,987 5,298 3,252 3,024 3,165 14,739
Irregular Avg. 339.0 321.2 340.1 333.5 Irregular 24.8 16.4 13.3 16.9 Irregular 9.3 9.7 18.2 13.8
Std. (136.9) (117.4) (148.7) (136.8) (20.5) (20.8) (21.7) (21.6) (28.5) (45.3) (79.2) (62.4)
N 401 676 939 2,016 422 566 846 1,834 354 635 935 1,924
Self-emp. Avg. 364.7 390.9 396.2 385.5 Self-emp. 38.2 25.0 24.3 29.3 Self-emp. 39.1 31.8 33.9 34.5
Std. (166.6) (199.4) (223.) (200.4) (42.6) (30.9) (40.1) (38.9) (88.3) (75.8) (99.5) (89.1)
N 119 138 161 418 130 113 134 377 93 120 149 362
Unemployed Avg. 345.6 329.3 311.4 323.0 Unemployed 27.3 16.1 9.8 15.0 Unemployed 4.2 2.8 4.8 4.0
Std. (164.7) (151.2) (144.) (150.2) (21.3) (21.4) (20.4) (21.8) (17.5) (15.4) (29.) (23.2)
N 172 425 571 1,168 182 343 514 1,039 169 419 548 1,136
Total Avg. 409.8 395.4 383.0 380.4 392.2 Total 28.7 32.5 29.2 25.5 29.2 Total 39.7 37.7 33.7 31.2 35.6
Std. (182.4) (177.9) (176.3) (182.1) (180.1) (28.4) (32.1) (34.8) (35.3) (32.6) (82.1) (88.4) (89.3) (88.4) (86.9)
N 5,083 5,018 5,067 5,059 20,227 4,873 5,298 3,868 4,198 18,237 5,298 3,868 4,198 4,797 18,161
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Table 3: Estimated Results from the Fixed Effect Model 
 (Δln C is the response variable) 
 
 
Note: The numerical value is the regression coefficient and the values between parentheses 
standard errors. ΔLT is Δ individual resident tax, ΔNT is Δ income tax, and the Cemp variable 
represents changes in employment status. Cemp = 1 represents maintaining regular employment, 
Cemp = 2 represents moving from regular to irregular employment, Cemp = 3 represents moving 
from employment (regular, irregular, or self) to unemployment, and Cemp = 4 represents all other 
changes. The standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
ΔLT -0.001 (0.000) *
Cemp = 2 -0.048 (0.021) ** -0.015 (0.025)
Cemp = 3 -0.096 (0.025) *** -0.037 (0.027)
Cemp = 4 0.020 (0.025) 0.028 (0.022)
ΔLT × Cemp = 2 -0.004 (0.002) **
ΔLT × Cemp = 3 -0.002 (0.001)
ΔLT × Cemp = 4 -0.000 (0.001)
ΔNT 0.001 (0.000) ***
ΔNT × Cemp = 2 0.001 (0.001)
ΔNT × Cemp = 3 0.002 (0.001) **
ΔNT × Cemp = 4 -0.001 (0.001)
Existence of spouse income -0.026 (0.017) -0.024 (0.017)
Existence of dependent children 0.020 (0.027) 0.035 (0.028)
Age 60 or more -0.024 (0.019) -0.016 (0.019)
House: rent 0.074 (0.071) 0.062 (0.069)
House: other 0.016 (0.053) -0.016 (0.053)
ΔHC -0.015 (0.005) *** -0.013 (0.005) **
Year: 2009 -0.012 (0.010) -0.003 (0.011)
Year: 2010 0.014 (0.011) 0.022 (0.011) **
Cons. -0.011 (0.013) -0.013 (0.014)
N 9,881 9,290
The number of respondents 4,606 4,318
F 5.33 *** 7.42 ***
(1) (2)
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Table 4: Marginal Effect for Changes in Tax by Change in Employment Status 
Panel A: Marginal Effect for Δ Individual Resident Tax by Change in Employment 
Status 
 
 
Panel B: Marginal Effect for Δ Income Tax by Change in Employment Status 
 
 
Note: The figures in Panel A correspond to the slopes of the lines in Panel A of Figure 2, and 
differences in marginal effect correspond to differences in the slope of those lines. Similarly, Panel 
B corresponds to the slopes and differences in slope in Panel B of Figure 2. The Cemp variable 
represents changes in employment status: Cemp = 1 represents maintaining regular employment, 
Cemp = 2 represents moving from regular to irregular employment, Cemp = 3 represents moving 
from employment (regular, irregular, or self) to unemployment, and Cemp = 4 represents all other 
changes. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Marginal effect Est. S.E. z-value
Cemp = 1 -0.09% (0.05%) -1.80 *
Cemp = 2 -0.44% (0.16%) -2.72 ***
Cemp = 3 -0.24% (0.13%) -1.82 *
Cemp = 4 -0.10% (0.09%) -1.16
Diff. (Cemp = 2) - (Cemp = 1) -0.35% (0.17%) -2.08 **
Diff. (Cemp = 3) - (Cemp = 1) -0.15% (0.14%) -1.08
Diff. (Cemp = 4) - (Cemp = 1) -0.01% (0.10%) -0.10
Marginal effect Est. S.E. z-value
Cemp = 1 0.09% (0.02%) 4.01 ***
Cemp = 2 0.22% (0.08%) 2.77 ***
Cemp = 3 0.27% (0.06%) 4.23 ***
Cemp = 4 0.01% (0.10%) 0.10
Diff. (Cemp = 2) - (Cemp = 1) 0.13% (0.08%) 1.53
Diff. (Cemp = 3) - (Cemp = 1) 0.18% (0.07%) 2.57 **
Diff. (Cemp = 4) - (Cemp = 1) -0.08% (0.11%) -0.78
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Appendix A: Sample Characteristics 
Panel A: Changes in the Number of Respondents by Age 
 
 
Panel B: Changes in the Number of Respondents by Employment Status 
 
 
Panel C: Changes in the Number of Respondents by Change in Employment Status  
 
 
Note: Cemp = 1 represents maintaining regular employment, Cemp = 2 represents moving from 
regular to irregular employment, Cemp = 3 represents moving from employment (regular, irregular, 
or self) to unemployment, and Cemp = 4 represents all other changes. 
Age Year = 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
52 511 0 0 0 511
53 512 511 0 0 1,023
54 556 512 511 0 1,579
55 580 556 512 511 2,159
56 600 580 556 512 2,248
57 593 600 580 556 2,329
58 710 593 600 580 2,483
59 651 710 593 600 2,554
60 376 651 710 593 2,330
61 209 376 651 710 1,946
62 0 209 376 651 1,236
63 0 0 209 376 585
64 0 0 0 209 209
Total 5,298 5,298 5,298 5,298 21,192
Employment Year = 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Regular 5,298 4,564 4,004 3,558 17,424
Irregular 0 422 712 984 2,118
Self-emp. 0 130 147 169 446
Unemployed 0 182 435 587 1,204
Total 5,298 5,298 5,298 5,298 21,192
Cemp Year = 2008 2009 2010 Total
1 4,564 3,851 3,380 11,795
2 552 444 404 1,400
3 182 318 296 796
4 0 685 1,218 1,903
Total 5,298 5,298 5,298 21,192
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Appendix B: Relationship Between Δ Individual Resident Tax and Δln Consumption 
Panel A: Scatterplot and Histogram of All Data for ΔLT and Δln C  
 
 
Panel B： Scatterplot of ΔLT and Δln C by Employment Status 
 
 
Note: The unit used for Δ individual resident tax is JPY 10,000 per month. The fitted values line 
represents expected values using OLS regression. 
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Appendix C: Relationship Between Δ Income Tax and Δln Consumption 
Panel A: Scatterplot and Histogram of All Data for ΔNT and Δln C 
 
 
Panel B: Scatterplots for ΔNT and Δln C by Employment Status 
 
 
Note: The unit used for Δ income tax is JPY 10,000 per month. The fitted values line represents 
expected values using OLS regression. 
 
